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I.

INTRODUCTION

In the late 1800's, most states imposed constitutional and
statutory limitations upon the debt-incurring ability of state and
local governments. 1 These restrictions were applied primarily in
response to the financial debacles of the 1830's and early 1840's
when governments engaged in heavy borrowing to finance internal improvements such as canals and railroads.' Soon after the
limitations were imposed, however, it became evident that the
measures were too rigid and did not allow local officials to provide for even a conservative level of improvements. Consequently, courts began to validate a number of devices whereby a
city or other municipal corporation could evade debt limitations.
The most important device to emerge was the Special Fund
Doctrine.8
In its initial form, the Special Fund Doctrine was a simple
concept consistent with the rationale underlying debt limitation.
Briefly stated, the doctrine provided that an obligation which
was to be repaid solely from a particular project financed was
not debt subject to constitutional, statutory, or charter limitations. 4 In effect, the obligation became a "self-liquidating" project. However, as time passed and memories of the financial
disasters of the 1880's grew dim, courts applied the Special Fund
* Cushing, Johnstone & Peterson, McMinnville, Oregon; B.A. 1980, University of

Redlands; J.D. 1983, Lewis and Clark Law School.

1. Bowmar, The Anachronism Called Debt Limitation, 52 IOWA L. REv. 863 (1967).
2. Gelfand, Seeking Local Government FinancialIntegrity Through Debt Ceilings,
Tax Limitations, and Expenditure Limits: The New York City Fiscal Crisis, the Taxpayers' Revolt, and Beyond, 63 MINN. L. REv. 545 (1979); Bowmar, supra note 1, at 863.
3. Other devices include special assessments, separate taxing authorities, and saleleaseback agreements. See generally Williams & Nehemkis, Municipal Improvement As
Affected by Constitutional Debt Limitations, 37 COLUM. L. REV. 177 (1937).
4. See 56 AM. JuR. 2D Municipal Corporations § 654 (1971); Annot., 146 A.L.R. 328
(1943); Annot., 96 A.L.R. 1385, 1395 (1935); Annot., 72 A.L.R. 695 (1931).
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Doctrine in a variety of situations which stretched, if not totally
escaped, the concept of self-liquidation. To determine whether a
special fund existed, it became necessary to ask whether a debt
was payable out of tax monies rather than whether a debt was
payable solely from the proceeds of the particular project
financed. In a sense, the doctrine was transformed from an
exception to the rule to the general rule itself. So long as the
source of repayment was related to the project funded, the obligation was not debt unless tax dollars were subject to liability.
This broad special fund concept worked well in the early
and mid-1900's. There were relatively few local government
defaults,' and the federal government assumed a more active
role in the construction of highways and other large projects.
Courts had no incentive to restrict the scope of the doctrine
because by expanding the sources of payment for any municipal
debt, the risk to the investor decreased. As a consequence, the
borrowing costs to the municipality were reduced.
However, with the Reagan administration's revival of federalism, more and more financial responsibility will likely be
placed upon local governments. Moreover, population increases
and the energy situation have imposed upon city officials the
burdensome task of raising the tremendous amounts of capital
required to build mass transit and alternate energy facilities.
The weakness of the Broad Special Fund Doctrine becomes
evident when viewed in light of its application to an enormous
debt such as construction of a multi-billion dollar power plant.
Furthermore, the doctrine is directly at odds with the purposes
underlying constitutional and statutory debt limitations. This
article will present a brief history of debt limitation provisions.
Next, it will discuss the history of the Special Fund Doctrine
and will set forth criticisms of the Broad Special Fund Doctrine.
The article will conclude by recommending a concept for a Narrow Special Fund Doctrine and by applying it to the construction of two nuclear power plants by the Washington Public
Power Supply System (WPPSS)l in order to illustrate the recon5. Bowmar, supra note 1, at 880.
6. The Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS) is a municipal corporation created by statute, WASH. REV. CODE § 43.52.250 (1981) and composed of 19 public
utility districts and four city electric departments in Washington state. WPPSS is
authorized to construct nuclear generating facilities, WASH. REV. CODE § 43.52.300
(1981), and, as late as December, 1981, was overseeing the simultaneous construction of
five nuclear power plants in Washington. The WPPSS 4 and 5 project is utilized as an
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ciliation of the conflicting goals of sound fiscal policy and practical flexibility.

II.

HISTORY OF DEBT LIMITATION PROVISIONS

7

In the early 1800's, many states sold bonds backed by their
general taxing power to finance improvements in transportation
and other commercial projects.8 The first such project was the
Erie Canal, financed by the State of New York in the 1820's.,
The canal was an enormous financial success as toll revenue
quickly exceeded the interest payments on the debt. 10 More
importantly, the canal established New York City as a leader in
trade with the frontier, and raised land and farm prices in the
state as well. 1 Other states looked with envy upon the benefits
gained by commercial and agricultural interests in New York,
and soon many other large scale public improvement projects
were concocted. 2 Modeled after the Erie Canal, the projects
were backed by the general credit and taxing power of each individual state. Unlike the canal, however, many of these projects
were neither well-planned nor necessary.
With the advent of the financial panic of 1837, many of the
speculative schemes produced little or no revenue although the
indebtedness had been contracted and the proceeds spent. 3
When the tremendous debt service costs became due, state governments had no choice but to impose heavy taxes to pay the
obligations. The taxpayer reaction was predictably bitter."'
example here because of the large amount of money at risk (over 2.5 billion dollars in
principal), the failure of the project, and the fact that the financing scheme relied upon
the Special Fund Doctrine.
7. For a more detailed account of the events leading up to the imposition of debt
limitations, see B. RATCHFORD, AMERICAN STATE DEBTS (1941); H. ADAMS, PUBLIC DEBTS
(1887); Secrist, An Economic Analysis of the ConstitutionalRestrictions Upon Public
Indebtedness in the United States, 8 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVEsrry OF WISCONSIN, EcoNOMIC AND POLTrICA SCIENCE SERIS 1 (1914); A. J. HEINS, CONSTTUfTONAL RESTmRCTIONS
AGAINST STATE DESTs (1963); and W. SCOTT, THE REPUDIATION OF STATE DaTs (1894).
8. Gelfand, supra note 2, at 546.
9. Id.
10. A. J. HEINS, supra note 7, at 3.

11. B. RATCHFORD, supra note 7, at 546.
12. A. J. HEINS, supra note 7, at 4.
13. Id. at 7.
14. The citizens of that part of the state in which I reside are particularly tenacious upon the subject of public debt and taxation. They have been taxed, and
re-taxed and over-taxed, year after year.. .. And sir, we ask now, that debtcontracting, loan-laws, and money-squandering may forever be put an end
to-that the whole system may be dug up by the roots and no single sprout
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Moreover, in some states, the magnitude of the debts incurred
exceeded the taxpayer's ability to meet these obligations. Thus,
many states were forced to repudiate or suspend payment on
their loans."8 Between 1840 and 1850, in response to heavy political pressure from angry citizens, 19 states 16 amended their constitutions to include restrictions on legislative borrowing.'7
These provisions were largely copied by new states which subsequently entered the Union.18
In the years following the Civil War, interest in internal
improvements, especially railroads, was revived. Local governments, generally unregulated by the original debt limitations,
assumed an entrepreneurial role similar to that played by the
states in the 1840's.' 9 Because of the great economic and social
advantages to be gained by securing a railroad line, many cities
granted extravagant subsidies to railroads in the form of land
grants, extensions of public credit, and public investment in railroad stock.2 0 As with the Erie Canal, most of these subsidies
were financed through bond sales backed by the general taxing
power of the municipal government.
ever be permitted to ever be hung up around the necks of the people of this
state again ....
Leave no sprout to germinate into "plunder laws" and taxation-secure the public treasury against all such drains, burdens, waste, and
plundering systems, so that one can at least rest secure in the future, and as if
there was a "good time coming" when our taxes would be lessened, and we
finally be relieved of the intolerable debt and taxation which now hangs upon
Us.
REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION FOR REVISION OF THE CONsTITUrION FOR THE STATE OF OHIO 1850-1, at 469 (1851).

15. Mississippi, Florida, Arkansas and Michigan repudiated debts totalling nearly
$14 million. Five additional states defaulted on loan payments. See A. J. HENS, supra
note 7 at 8.
16. Bowmar, supra note 1, at 863.
17. A typical debt provision is one enacted by Rhode Island in 1842:
The general assembly shall have no power, hereafter, without the express consent of the people, to incur state debts to an amount exceeding fifty thousand
dollars, except in time of war, or in case of insurrection or invasion; nor shall
they in any case, without such consent, pledge the faith of the state for the
payment of the obligations of others.
R.I. CONST. art. IV, § 13 (repealed June 28, 1951).
18. Bowmar, supra note 1, at 863; see, e.g., Wormington v. Pierce, 22 Or. 606, 612,
30 P. 450, 451 (1892).
19. Comment, Legal Limitations on Public Inducement to IndustrialLocation, 59
COLUM. L. REV. 618, 620 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Legal Limitations]; Bowmar, supra
note 1, at 864; Gelfand, supra note 2, at 547; Williams & Nehemkis, supra note 3, at 17779.
20. Bowmar, supra note 1, at 864; Gelfand, supra note 2, at 547; Williams &
Nehemkis, supra note 3, at 177-79.
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Contemporaneously, under the name of "public improvement," heavy, ill-considered expenditures were made for streets,
sewers, waterworks, and many other projects."1 The result was
that by 1880 municipal debt had reached the sum of
$728,000,000."1 The excessiveness of the amount is illustrated
when compared with a municipal debt in 1840 of scarcely
$20,000,000.'s Amid the financial panic of 1873, many cities
defaulted on their debt payments.' The states reacted by
imposing constitutional debt limitations on local governmental
units similar to the "pay as you go" policy of state restrictions.25
Additional limitations were applied in the wake of a new wave of
municipal defaults which coincided with the panic and depression of 1893."
The constitutional debt restrictions were generally of three
types: (1) local units were forbidden to lend credit to or acquire
stock in private corporations; (2) the amount of municipal debt
was limited to a specified percentage of assessed value of property subject to tax;27 and, (3) the amount of indebtedness
incurred in any one year was limited to the income and revenue
for that year. ' These types of restrictions generally prevail
today with a debt-to-property ratio being the most common
type." In addition, some states delegate the form and amount of
the limitations to the legislature or city charters. 0 Most states
exempt restrictions in situations where local voter approval has
been given to a debt, although generally more than a mere
majority is required. It is generally agreed that the primary purpose of the ceilings was to promote sound fiscal policy by
preventing in advance the imposition of an excessive tax
21. Williams & Nehemkis, supra note 3, at 179.
22. Id. at 180.
23. Id.
24. Secrist, supra note 7, at 59-60. It has been estimated that 13 to 20 percent of
municipal bonds were in default during the years 1873-79. Gelfand, supra note 2, at 547.
25. Gelfand, supra note 2, at 547.
26. Id.
27. See 15 E. McQUILLIN, Tez LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 41.08 (3rd ed.
1970).
28. Id. at § 41.10.
29. See Bowers, Limitations On Municipal Indebtedness, 5 VAND. L. Rav. 37
(1951).
30. E.g., article XI, § 5 of the Oregon Constitution states that "Acts of the Legislative Assembly, incorporating towns, and cities, shall restrict their powers of taxation,
borrowing money, contracting debts, and loaning their credit."
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burden."
When the taxpayers finally moved to enact debt limitations,
they imposed excessively confining restrictions. One commentator explained that the debt provisions were apparently based
upon the premise that strict standards would provide the surest
protection and that the limits permitted enough room for local
governments to provide for future needs.3 2 However, both of
these assumptions soon proved to be faulty. The limitation provisions were simply too rigid to accommodate the compelling
demands of government. Pressures created by the public's desire
for expanded services such as sewage disposal, garbage collection, parking lots, utilities, and other services served to convince
individual courts that strict compliance with the limitations
would impose substantial hardships.33 Confronted by these practical realities, the courts approved a number of devices which
enabled state and local officials to evade debt limitations.u The
most commonly used of these devices today is the special fund.
III.

THE SPECIAL FUND DOCTRINE

The Special Fund Doctrine was first created by analogy to

an earlier evasive device, the special assessment. Under the special assessment theory, obligations were issued by a city to cover
the cost of an improvement and were payable solely from
charges upon the property directly benefited. Special assessment improvements were generally of a non-income producing
nature, such as a street, sewer, or sidewalk. Courts were sympathetic to the use of the device. The procedure imposed no general tax burden on the public as a whole and was therefore con31. The reasoning behind the restrictions is variously denominated as a desire
to promote the common good and welfare; to provide the minority with a
means of checking an improvident majority; to install the city on a pay as you
go basis; to prevent the present administration from imposing too great a burden on its successors and on the taxpayers at large; to prevent the pledging of
more than a certain part of the taxpayers' property for debt; to check the
proneness of a municipality to incur indebtedness, especially where the burden
can be cast on posterity; to serve as a limit to taxation and for protection of
the taxpayers; to maintain municipal solvency; and to protect persons and
their property from an abuse of corporate credit and its consequent burdensome, perhaps ruinous taxation.
Bowers, supra note 29, at 41 (See citations therein).
32. Bowmar, supra note 1, at 867.
33. See Bowers, supra note 29, at 44.
34. See generally Williams & Nehemkis, supra note 3.
35. See Bowers, supra note 29, at 47; Bowmar, supra note 1, at 873-74.
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sistent with the theory of debt limitation. In effect, a
governmental unit served merely as a conduit for funds to pass
from users of the improvement to the financiers of the project.
Thus, all risk of loss fell upon the bond holders.
With the special assessment precedent firmly established,
the Supreme Court of Washington was apparently the first to
extend the conduit idea one step further to encompass a special
fund. In the case of Winston v. City of Spokane," the Washington Supreme Court held that obligations created to complete a
system of waterworks did not constitute debt within the meaning of the state constitutional debt limitations. The obligations
were payable solely from a fund consisting of revenues derived
from the waterworks. The court noted that in no event would
the city be required to make payment on the debt out of its general funds. Failure to create the fund was deemed the only possible liability for the city; thus, the transaction was considered
equivalent to an issue of warrants payable out of a fund created
by an assessment upon property benefited by a local
87
improvement.
In Winston, the Washington court implicitly defined the
word "debt," within the context of its constitutional prohibitions, to mean the general credit or general revenues of a city. At
that time, municipal revenue consisted almost exclusively of tax
receipts.," The Winston court found the obligation acceptable
because repayment on the debt was limited to a fund fed solely
by income from the completed project. The project thus was
self-liquidating, and the taxpayers of Spokane were insulated
from risk of loss on the project. Since public revenues were protected, the obligation was held not to be "debt" within the scope
of the constitutional ceilings.
Although many other states considering the matter soon
agreed that a self-liquidating special fund was not debt, a split
of authority arose as to just how self-supporting a special fund
had to be. The restrictions placed upon the doctrine by individ36. 12 Wash. 524, 41 P. 888 (1895).
37. The general credit of the city is in no manner pledged except for the performance of its duty in the creation of such special fund. The transaction,
therefore, is no more the incurring of an indebtedness on the part of the city
than is the issue of warrants payable out of a special fund created by an assessment upon the property to be benefited by a local improvement.
12 Wash. at 527, 41 P. at 889.
38. Gelfand, supra note 2, at 549; see also Bowmar, supra note 1, at 867.
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ual courts separated the various states into two schools of
thought: those favoring the narrow special fund and those supporting a broad special fund. 9 The distinguishing factor
between the two concerned what revenues could properly be
included within the special fund.
The State of Illinois in 1902 was one of the first to recognize
the restricted or narrow special fund in the leading case of City
of Joliet v. Alexander.40 In Alexander, the city proposed by
ordinance to sell fund certificates to finance the construction of
an extension to the existing system of waterworks. The ordinance provided that a mortgage would be placed on the entire
waterworks system, and in addition, required the city to deposit
all water revenues into a special fund. The fund was to be solely
liable for repayment of the certificates. In holding that the plan
created debt and was therefore invalid, the Illinois Supreme
Court noted that the special fund would be fed by existing property of the city in the form of established revenues. Thus,
[t]his is not a case where there is no obligation of the city
except performance of a duty in the creation and management
of a fund, and where the waterworks, upon paying for themselves, will become the property of the city. The reasoning in
Winston v. Spokane, 41 Pac. Rep. 88, cannot be applied to a
case like this and could only apply to property or a fund which
the city never had, or the property is to be paid for by its own
earnings without imposing any further liability on the city. " '
The view expressed in. City of Joliet v. Alexander reflected
a relatively strict interpretation of constitutional language.
States adhering to the Narrow Special Fund Doctrine insisted
that if a municipal obligation was to be judicially exempted from
constitutional or charter debt limitations, the obligation must be
completely self-liquidating. Thus, for example, if a city or a state
wished to create a special fund to finance additions to an
existing system of waterworks, the special fund had to be limited
to only those revenues directly allocable to the additions.
The narrow special fund concept was initially accepted by a
large number of jurisdictions, most notably California4 2 and
39. See Bowers, supra note 29, at 48-49; Williams & Nehemkis, supra note 3, at
188-97. See also citations, supra note 4.
40. 194 Ill. 457, 62 N.E. 861 (1902).
41. Id. at 464, 62 N.E. at 863.
42. Garrett v. Swanton, 216 Cal. 220, 13 P.2d 725 (1932), rev'd sub nom. City of
Oxnard v. Dale, 45 Cal. 2d 729, 290 P.2d 859 (1955).
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Utah.4 3 However, as time went by, nearly every one of these
states rejected their former position in favor of the more flexible
broad special fund concept."

The trend continues presently;

today the vast majority of states follow, either implicitly or
expressly, the Broad Special Fund Doctrine. 5
IV.

CRITICISM OF THE BROAD SPECIAL FUND DOCTRINE

In contrast to the narrow special fund, the broad special
fund concept reflects a relatively loose interpretation of constitutional debt provisions. The Broad Special Fund Doctrine
essentially provides that an obligation, if it is to be repaid solely
out of revenues related to the project financed, will not be considered debt subject to limitations unless the bondholders have
a potential legal claim upon tax monies.46 The key question to
ask in determining the existence of a qualified broad special
fund is whether tax dollars are subject to liability on the debt.
An illustration of how a broad special fund differs from a
narrow special fund may be shown by a simple example. Suppose a city wishes to finance the construction of a new electrical
generating plant because of a projected demand in the immediate future far in excess of the capacity of its existing plant. If
the city were to sell bonds and agree to make payments thereon
solely out of the revenues it derived from the operation of its
entire electrical system, the plan would be considered debt
under the narrow special fund concept, but not under a Broad
Special Fund Doctrine analysis.
The financing plan would not qualify as a narrow special
fund because the sources of repayment on the obligation
included presently-existing revenues. These revenues are attributable not to the plan financed, but to the generator already
owned by the city. Therefore, the financing plan is not completely self-liquidating as required by the narrow Special Fund
Doctrine.47 On the other hand, under the Broad Special Fund
43. Fjeldsted v. Ogden City, 83 Utah 278, 28 P.2d 144 (1933).
44. City of Oxnard v. Dale, 45 Cal. 2d 729, 290 P.2d 859 (1955); Ward v. City of
Chicago, 342 IMI.167, 173 N.E. 810 (1930).
45. Williams & Nehemkis, supra note 3, at 209-11. See also citations, supra note 4.
46. Butler v. City of Ashland, 113 Or. 174, 232 P. 655 (1925); Frank v. City of Cody,
572 P.2d 1106 (Wyo. 1977); Board of Comm'rs v. All Taxpayers, 360 So. 2d 863 (La.
1978); State ex rel Grimes County Taxpayers Ass'n v. Texas Mun. Power Agency, 565
S.W.2d 258 (Tex. 1978); Johnson v. Piedmont Mun. Power Agency, 277 S.C. 345, 287
S.E.2d 476 (1982).
47. City of Joliet v. Alexander, 194 I1. at 464, 62 N.E. at 863.
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Doctrine, the very same financing scheme would not be "debt"
within the scope of the limitation provisions. The plan does not
commit or implicate tax monies in repayment of the bond;
therefore, the fund created would qualify as a bona fide "special
fund" under the broad view.
Although many states originally embraced the narrow special fund idea, several factors lead to the general acceptance of
the Broad Special Fund Doctrine. Chief among these was the
apparent intention expressed in the debt limitations themselves
of protecting local taxpayers from excessive taxation. Given
that most debt provisions were originally phrased in terms of tax
revenues or assessed value of property subject to tax,48 it is not
surprising that courts tended to focus primarily on tax monies in
construing the scope of the ceilings. Moreover, it appears that
when confronted with a particular financing scheme that was
potentially self-liquidating, and at the same time with the fact
that there had been few recent defaults, 9 courts were inclined to
approve projects which were unquestionably desirable and
necessary.50
One additional factor which may have prompted the general
adoption of the broad special fund concerns the necessity of
allocation and segregation of revenue which lies at the heart of
the narrow doctrine." A leading article on the subject noted
48. E.g., UTAH CONST. art. XIV, § 4; IOWA CONST. art. XI, § 3.
49. Bowmar, supra note 1, at 880.
50. For an example of just how far a court will go to uphold politically desirable
projects, see Board of Comm'rs v. All Taxpayers, 360 So. 2d 863 (La. 1978)(court upheld
utility plan to issue revenue bonds payable from revenues of entire municipal utility
system despite statutory language that the bonds be payable "solely from the revenues
derived from the operation of the public project constructed or acquired with the proceeds of such revenue bonds."). Compare this with the Louisiana Court of Appeals decision in the same case, 355 So. 2d 578 (La. 1978)(repayment plan constituted a possible
charge upon the other revenues of city).
51. As a leading article on the subject notes:
But there is usually a more pragmatic argument against the doctrine: the segregation of earnings to a part of a utility system is impractical. The generating
equipment of a light system is a separate integral unit; only when a complete
new generating plant has been installed has it been found possible to segregate
the earnings. That situation is exceptional. In the normal situation, it is impossible to segregate the earnings of a pole, a stretch of pipe, an additional dam.
Although many courts have talked readily of the segregation of the earnings of
an addition or extension, as opposed to the replacement involved in Bell v.
City of Fayette (325 Mo. 75, 28 S.W.2d 356 (1930)), not a single illustration
has been found where such segregation has been achieved to the satisfaction of
a court. In the one instance found in which municipal officials were courageous
enough to attempt such segregation in order to satisfy a court which adhered
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that, at least in 1937, the segregation and allocation of earnings
of each part of a utility system was thought to be impractical if
not impossible." The difficulty was particularly obvious when
special fund financing was analyzed in reference to an individual
521
telephone "pole, a stretch of pipe, [or] an additional dam. .
In discussing the narrow versus broad special fund question,
one additional point is worth mentioning: a surprisingly large
number of states have apparently not recognized that both a
broad and a narrow Special Fund Doctrine exist. Writing in
1937, two collaborating authors found that at least eight states
had applied the Special Fund Doctrine in a fact situation which
was within the broad fund category, yet had never expressly
rejected the narrow fund theory.5 3 The State of Oregon is a case
in point. In Butler v. City of Ashland,54 the Oregon Supreme
Court held that contractual liabilities incurred for the purchase
of 600 acre-feet of water did not constitute debt within the provisions of Article XI, Section 5 of the State Constitution of Oregon. The city issued "Certificates of Indebtedness" which provided that obligations were to be payable solely from revenues of
the water department and would not constitute a general obligation of the city. Because the special fund created apparently
consisted of the total water revenues, 5 rather than just those
revenues attributable to the sale of the 600 acre-feet of water,
the plan would be classified as a broad special fund.
In upholding the financing scheme, the court quoted with
passages from
approval two potentially contradictory 6
McQuillin:
A municipality does not create an indebtedness by obtaining
property to be paid for wholly out of the income of the
to the restricted special fund theory, the court found the theory of the apportionment unreasonable. Segregation is at best theoretical, and if the courts
assume the role of final arbiter in this realm of conjecture, the requirement
becomes impossible. There is little assurance that municipal officials will guess
correctly.
Williams & Nehemkis, supra note 3, at 196 (citation added). See also Kosel, Municipal
Debt Limitation in California, 7 GOLDEN GATE L. REv. 641, 658 (1977).
52. Williams & Nehemkis, supra note 3, at 196.
52.1 Id.
53. Id. at 210.
54. 113 Or. 174, 232 P. 655 (1925).
55. Id. at 180, 232 P. at 657.
56. The two quotations are potentially contradictory in that the first refers to a
"wholly" self-liquidating debt (i.e., a narrow special fund) while the second passage could
include either a narrow or a broad fund.
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property."
and
If an obligation is payable out of a special fund only, and the
municipality is not otherwise liable, it is generally held that
there is no indebtedness, subject to certain exceptions hereinafter noticed in this connection."
In contrast to Butler, the court in Morris v. City of Salem"
addressed the Special Fund Doctrine in terms of a narrow,
rather than a broad special fund. In Morris, a Salem taxpayer
sought to enjoin the city from entering into and performing a
contract for the purchase and installation of parking meters.
Under the contract, the city's sole source of payment on the liability consisted of a fund created by the deposit of 50 percent of
the meter receipts. No other sources of city revenue were obligated. The Oregon Supreme Court upheld the plan and in doing
so set forth the "general rule" regarding the Oregon Special
Fund Doctrine. 60
As the Oregon case examples illustrate, the broad fund concept has often been applied or extended without a conscious
weighing of the relative strengths and weaknesses of the doctrine. Perhaps the major weakness of the broad special fund
concerns the emphasis the doctrine places upon protecting taxpayers without extending the safeguards to other sources of public revenue. Since the effect of the Special Fund Doctrine is to
remove the obligation from the protections of the debt ceilings,
this concentration upon taxation is valid only if the exclusive
intent of the debt provisions is to protect tax revenues.
Early courts adopting the broad fund theory appear to have
indeed taken the view that the limits were intended to protect
local taxpayers from excessive taxation. Given that most debt
provisions were originally phrased in terms of tax revenues or
assessed value of property subject to tax, 61 it is not surprising
57. 113 Or. at 182, 232 P. at 657 (citing 5 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL
4725, § 2230).
58. 113 Or. at 183, 232 P. at 657 (citing 5

MCQUILLIN,

CORPORATIONS,

MUNICIPAL CORPOATIONS

4722, 4723, § 2228).
59. 179 Or. 666, 174 P.2d 192 (1946).
60. "The general rule is that the purchase of property by a city, to be paid for solely
out of income to be derived from the property purchased, does not create a debt or
liability in violation of constitutional, statutory or charter limitations." 179 Or. at 676,
174 P.2d at 197.
61. E.g., UTAH CONT. art. XIV, § 4; IOWA CONST. art. XI, § 3.
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that courts tend to focus primarily on tax monies in construing
the scope of the ceilings. However, this fact does not necessarily
indicate that the constitutional framers regarded the word taxes
as the sole evil to be remedied. Arguably, what the authors were
seeking to achieve was the protection of all citizens from unwise
and irresponsible government spending." That the provisions
were couched in terms of taxation can be explained simply by
reference to the historical period in which debt limitation arose.
In the 1850's, the broad range of local taxes and user charges
available today did not exist. Besides real estate taxes and state
grants, the only other sources of local government revenues were
funds generated by individual capital projects. These projects
were in turn backed by the local real estate taxing power. Thus,
it is not surprising that debt ceilings were initially framed in
terms of taxes. At the time, such language was the most logical
and direct means of achieving sound fiscal policy.63
In light of the times, which were characterized by unnecessary and unwise public spending, it appears that constitutional
and charter provisions restricting municipal debt were the product of a general "spirit of economy," rather than a special concern with taxation. Charles H. Carey, in his works on the Oregon
constitutional convention of 1857, commented along these same
lines and noted that the limitations upon public indebtedness
were but one of many economic vehicles popular with citizens
and constitutional authors of the day."
Putting aside the question of intent, there would seem to be
no justification today for continuing a distinction between "tax"
revenues and "other" revenues. In this context, other revenues
refer principally to funds generated through the operation of a
62. See Carruthers v. Port of Astoria, 249 Or. 329, 337, 438 P.2d 725, 728 (1968);
Bowmar, supra note 1, at 867; Legal Limitations, supra note 19, at 654.
63. Gelfand, supra note 2, at 549; Bowmar, supra note 1, at 867.
64. The constitution as framed by the convention and accepted by the people
proved to be well adapted to the requirements of the new state. While perhaps
it was a little tight in places, on the whole it was a model instrument for just
such a state and just such a people. The pioneers, none of whom was wealthy,

and many of whom had known the pinch of hard times and had suffered from
scarcity of the comforts of life, rather approved of the spirit of economy that

pervaded the various articles and sections. They liked the restrictions upon
public indebtedness and the prohibitions upon the use of public credit. ...
These, and many other economies, characterized the constitution and made it
acceptable.
THE OREGON CONSTITUTION AND PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE OREGON CONSTITUTIONAL

CONVENTION OF 1857, at 55-56 (C. H. Carey ed. 1926).
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utility owned by the municipality. Utility revenues consist primarily of user fees which are paid by individual ratepayers pursuant to their monthly electric, gas, or water utility bills.
There are four factors which weigh heavily against distinguishing between user fees (i.e., other revenue) and taxes: taxpayers and ratepayers are essentially the same people; user fees,
such as electricity and other necessities, are largely unavoidable; 6 in cases where the project fails or is never constructed,
user fees may be charged to persons who receive nothing in
return; and as a practical matter, a local government will likely
be compelled by nonlegal pressures to bail out a defaulting special fund obligation."
Several commentators have noted the obvious fact that
nearly every taxpayer is also a ratepayer.6 7 In light of the current state of municipal finance, one might venture to say that
user fees are tantamount to a property tax. One writer states
that the purpose once served by a special tax is now accomplished by a rate. e8 The writer observes that there are differences: for example, a rate is billed monthly rather than annually
and a rate is billed to the consumer based upon his use rather
than a calculation of property values.6 Nonetheless, a rate is
arguably little more than a streamlined, more fairly apportioned
tax.

70

It appears that courts have yet to explicitly repudiate the
distinction between user fees and taxes. However, at least two
state supreme court dissenting justices express reservation over
65. See generally Kosel, supra note 51, at 658; Johnson v. Piedmont Mun. Power
Agency, 277 S.C. 345, 287 S.E.2d 476 (1982); Goreham v. Des Moines Metropolitan Area
Solid Waste Agency, 179 N.W.2d 449 (Iowa 1970).
66. Kosel, supra note 51, at 659.
67. Bowmar, supra note 1, at 880; Durisch, Publicly Owned Utilities and the
Problems of Municipal Debt Limits, 31 MICH. L. Rnv. 503, 505-07 (1933).
68. The municipal ownership of utilities is common, as is the bond financing of
such services. The purpose once served by a special tax is now served by a rate.
There are differences: the rate is billed monthly instead of annually; hence it is
more collectable and makes for a perpetually liquid account. Also (significant
in metropolitan areas where the commuter population is large), the rate is
billed to the consumer instead of the rate payer; hence it is apportioned to the
user in exact ratio to his use. In basic function, however, the rate is merely an
improved, streamlined, more collectible, more fairly apportioned tax.
Virtue, The Public Use of Private Capital:A Discussion of Problems Related to Municipal Bond Financing, 35 VA. L. REv. 285, 294 (1949).
69. Id.

70. Id.
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the matter.7 ' In Johnson v. Piedmont Municipal Power
Agency, 2 the South Carolina Supreme Court upheld a legislative act which enabled municipalities in South Carolina to unite
in a joint agency and finance the construction or acquisition of a
nuclear generating plant through the issuance of bonds payable
by the entire revenues of each utility system. Under the terms of
the statute, a municipality could obligate itself to pay the joint
agency even if the project never produced any energy. Justice
Littlejohn, writing for the dissent, forcefully argued that the
substance and not the form of the financing arrangement should
prevail:
As mentioned above, PMPA would not be authorized to
impose an ad valorem tax against property owners to repay the
debt; thus, these bonds cannot be general obligation bonds in
the usual sense. . . . However, these bonds do pledge the
equivalent of the taxing power. The issuers of typical general
obligation bonds say in effect to the bond holder, "we will tax
the property owners if need be to repay the debt." Here, the
issuer of the bonds (PMPA) effectively says, "we will assess the
electric power users (i.e., rate payers) if need be to repay the
debt." I submit that both cases would usually involve basically
the same people. There is little difference between pledging
full faith and credit of the taxpayers and pledging the full faith
and credit of electric user-each involves captive payors. A
taxpayer must pay the tax or have his property sold; the rate
payer must pay the rate charge or either (1) discontinue the
use of electricity, or (2) move out of town . . . Inasmuch as
the act and the contracts authorize the municipalities to collect
money from its electric customers whether or not the project
ever generates any electricity, thereby charging the customers
for power never received, I think the bonds lose their identity
bonds and must be
as revenue-producing or special source
78
treated as general obligation bonds.
In Goreham v. Des Moines Metropolitan Area Solid Waste
Agency,7 the Supreme Court of Iowa rejected a taxpayer's suit
challenging the constitutionality of a statute enabling a special
71. Johnson v. Piedmont Mun. Power Agency, 277 S.C. 345, 287 S.E.2d 476 (1978)
(Littlejohn, J., dissenting); Goreham v. Des Moines Metropolitan Area Solid Waste
Agency, 179 N.W.2d 449 (Iowa 1970) (Becker, J., dissenting). See also Chemical Bank v.
WPPSS, 99 Wash. 2d 772 (1983), (Dore, J., concurring).
72. 277 S.C. 345, 287 S.E.2d 476 (1982).
73. Id. at 362-63, 287 S.E.2d at 485 (Littlejohn, J., dissenting).
74. 179 N.W.2d 449 (Iowa 1970).
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agency to issue bonds payable from garbage disposal revenues.
The dissenting justice, however, thought that the Special Fund
Doctrine did not apply.
To me at least the distinction is this. Where the service is to be
rendered by the taxing unit to substantially all of the people
and is considered so important that its financing must be
implemented by involuntary payments by the taxpayers in the
form of taxation, tax liens, or equivalent (collected like taxes),
the revenue derived from the furnishing of such service is government revenue which will not give rise to the special fund
theory. Where the service to be performed by the taxing unit is
such that it may be accepted or rejected by the people and is
not so important as to necessarily invoke the tax collection
powers (or equivalent), then the income derived from such service is independent revenue which may qualify for the Special
Fund Doctrine.76
The Johnson dissent keyed on the fact that the nuclear
power plants PMPA sought to purchase might never be built or
produce electricity. In cases where payment is unrelated to any
direct benefit received, or in fact where nothing is received, one
of the primary distinguishing factors between ratepayers and
taxpayers disappears. As noted in the Goreham dissent, the distinction is further reduced where the service rendered by the
local government takes the form of a necessity and therefore is
virtually unavoidable.
In other contexts, the courts have found detriment to the
taxpayers of the city when revenues derived from a utility were
appropriated.7 6 The California Supreme Court held in Mines v.
Del Valle that the fact that public funds were derived from a
public utility rather than raised by direct taxation was immaterial. The inevitable result would be a detriment to the taxpayers
7
of the city.
Assuming arguendo that there is indeed a valid distinction
between taxes and user fees, it is doubtful whether a local unit's
general revenues are ever truly insulated from liability for a special fund obligation. In the event that revenues from the fund
are inadequate, a number of practical and political factors may
75. Id. at 464 (Becker, J., dissenting).
76. See City of Bessemer v. Personnel Bd. for Jefferson County, 240 Ala. 411, 199
So. 2d 815 (1941); Porter v. Tiffany, 11 Or. App. 542, 502 P.2d 1385 (1972).
77. Mines v. Del Valle, 201 Cal. 273, 279-80, 257 P. 530, 534 (1927), overruled, Stanson v. Mott, 17 Cal. 3d 206, 551 P.2d 1, 130 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1976).

1983]

Broad Special Fund Doctrine

compel a government to assume the debt in spite of the fact that
no legal obligation exists. 78 Foremost among these considerations
is the fact that the default of a special fund obligation may
impair a municipality's credit rating for several decades.7 Given
the constantly growing reliance of municipalities upon private
capital, the success of a special fund obligation may be vital to
the financial stability of the parent municipality.80 Additionally,
given that a special fund obligation is regarded as nondebt, special fund liabilities are not taken into account in calculating the
financial strength of a community.8 1 Thus, a municipality may
be led to overextend itself based upon an erroneous assessment
of the strength of local resources.
Admittedly, many of the criticisms directed toward the
Broad Special Fund Doctrine above would be equally applicable
to an attack on the self-sustaining/liquidating concept in general. That is neither the intent of this article, nor suggested as a
desirable path to follow. The Special Fund Doctrine is indeed a
necessary and valuable tool when used with caution. The doctrine allows flexibility in meeting the practical needs of local
government. It also drastically reduces the inequities which
result from one generation paying for a project benefiting the
next. 82 Likewise, the doctrine efficiently allocates the burden of
an improvement among those currently receiving benefits. Moreover, in its purest form, the doctrine is consistent with a policy
of debt limitation.
78. Special funds are special largely because the government designates them
as such. This accounting procedure may have little functional significance. The
sponsoring government, to preserve its good name in financial circles, may
have to assume special fund obligations should the fund prove inadequate.
Also, a special fund's creditors, pursuing their remedies may coerce payment
from the general fund, for the foreclosure of a mortgage securing special fund
obligations can be as onerous to the government as the foreclosure of a mortgage securing general obligations. And if foreclosure is unavailable, the holders
of defaulted bonds may compel an increase of rates payable to the special
fund. This, in turn, may induce the rate payers to exercise their political power
to force the government into assuming the debt or making periodic additional
payments to preserve the existing rates.
Morris, Evading Debt Limitations with Public Building Authorities: The Costly Subversion of State Constitutions,68 YALE L.J. 234, 264 (1958).
79. H. C. SHERWOOD, How CORPORATE AND MUNIciAL DEBT Is RATED: AN INSIDE
LOOK AT STANDARD & POOR'S RATING SYSTEM 118 (1976).

80. Virtue, supra note 68, at 294-95.
81. Virtue, supra note 68, at 293-94.

82. Gelfand, supra note 2, at 549-51.
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NARROW SPECIAL FUND DOCTRINE

Despite the benefits which the Special Fund Doctrine may
provide, the social policies inherent in constitutional, statutory,
and charter debt limitations are of equal significance. 83 In
reviewing the logic underlying the Broad Special Fund Doctrine,
the objective must be to determine whether the courts are maintaining a proper balance between the conflicting goals of public
protection and practical necessity. In light of the discussion
above and the case example which follows, it is submitted that
the Broad Special Fund Doctrine goes too far in the direction of
flexibility and seriously neglects the policy of debt limitation. It
is the primary recommendation of this article that the Broad
Special Fund Doctrine be abolished or, at the very least, substantially modified.
A more balanced approach would appear to lie in the use of
a Narrow Special Fund Doctrine. The narrow fund theory provides the benefits of flexibility and efficiency of allocation inherent in the Special Fund Doctrine while at the same time maintaining a closer rein on municipal debt. The doctrine would be
applicable to all sources of public revenue and not simply those
raised by taxation, thereby extending to ratepayers the protections currently afforded only to taxpayers. More importantly,
because a narrow special fund requires that an obligation be
"payable solely out of the proceeds of the particular project
financed," or be subjected to the debt ceilings, the narrow doctrine would protect against situations where citizens are forced
to repay the costs of speculative projects which are either never
completed or unnecessary.
Admittedly, there are hurdles to overcome before the
restricted special fund will be widely accepted. As courts and
commentators have noted," there are perceived impracticalities
in allocating and segregating revenues between existing plans
and improvements thereto. But these difficulties may be easily
remedied. While it may indeed be impossible to determine the
exact revenue attributable to an individual electric pole or bus,
special fund financing would normally not be used to purchase
83. Although many commentators have criticized debt ceilings, Bowmar, supra note
1, and some have even called for their repeal, Legal Limitations, supra note 19, at 645,
this writer recognizes the need for such provisions. Indeed, in light of recent events in
New York City, Cleveland and the Pacific Northwest, it is hardly persuasive to argue

that the marketplace and the wisdom of local officials wil prevent excessive debt.
84. See supra note 51.
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improvements of such a small magnitude.8 5 In cases involving
larger improvements, such as the addition of a new generator,
acceptable accounting methods will likely be found.
In any event, a strict and exact allocation of revenues is not
mandated by history nor likely to be an appropriate task for the
courts to perform. The historical setting from which the debt
ceilings arose, where the benefits received from improvements
were grossly disproportionate to their cost, suggests that the
original drafters were concerned primarily with preventing significant cost subsidies between the project financed and other
sources of public revenue. Therefore, it is reasonable that courts
today defer to the judgment of municipal officials, and limit
their inquiry to whether the improvement bears a reasonable
relationship to the revenue allocated to it.
The potential defects in the broad special fund theory can
perhaps best be understood by examining an illustration which
takes the logic and rules of the broad doctrine to the extreme.
The recent financial disasters surrounding the construction of
two nuclear power plants by the Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS) provide a perfect case example. Unfortunately, an account of the historical setting and contractual
details of the project, while most interesting, would be both
lengthy and irrelevant to the present discussion. Nonetheless,
the following paragraphs set forth an accurate, albeit abbreviated, review of the relevant facts.
In 1976, eighty-eight municipal utilities and public utility
districts (PUD) in six states8 entered into contracts with the
WPPSS to finance the construction of two nuclear power plants
commonly referred to as "WPPSS 4 and 5." By the terms of the
contracts (the Participants' Agreement), each utility agreed to
pay a specified percentage of the supply system's annual budget
(including payment on WPPSS bond obligations) in return for
an identical portion of the project's capability.8 7 The consideration received by each participant was phrased in terms of capability rather than electricity, and each participant agreed to
make payment under the contract regardless of whether any
electricity was ever produced.8 8 Additionally, the agreement pro85. Note, Constitutional Restrictions Upon Municipal Indebtedness, 66 UTAh L.
REv. 462, 477 (1966).
86. Oregon, Washington, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, and Wyoming.
87. Participants' Agreement §§ 1(a), 1(b), 1(v) and 5.
88. Participants' Agreement § 6(d).
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vided that ownership in the constructed facilities was to vest in
WPPSS89 and contained a covenant whereby each participant
agreed to maintain electric rates sufficient to meet its obligation
under the contract.90
Although the contract did not encompass the projected cost
of construction, there was apparently some consensus at the
time that the two plants could be built for approximately 2.5
billion dollars.0 1 However, the contract neither states this
approximate figure nor places a maximum limitation upon the
liability of each participant.
Apparently to avoid city charter and state constitutional
debt limitations, the contract sought to evoke the Broad Special
Fund Doctrine. Each Participant Agreement provided that a
municipal utility or PUD was not required to make any payments on the contract "except from the revenues derived by
such participant from the ownership and operation of its electric
utility properties .

. . ."9

Absent any further considerations,"

this clause would indeed create a valid broad special fund in a
majority of states because payment on the contract was limited
to a fund consisting solely of electrical revenues." Therefore, the
Participants' Agreement would not constitute debt and would be
beyond the reach of any debt limitation provisions based upon
the rationale that neither the general funds nor tax monies of
89. Participants' Agreement §§ 1(v), 5.
90. Participants' Agreement § 6(c), page 18.
91. Plaintiff's Brief at 56, Defazio v. WPPSS, Lane County Cir. Ct. Case No. 16-8111344 (Or. 1981) [hereinafter cited as Plaintiff's Brief].
92. Participants' Agreement § 6(c), page 18.
93. The WPPSS contracts also contained three other possible problem areas. In 6(c)
of the Participants' Agreement, each participant agreed to maintain electric rates sufficient to make payments under the contract. This might be looked upon as an impermissible delegation of rate-making authority. See Annot. 146 A.L.R. 328, 341 (1943); Annot.
96 A.L.R. 1385, 1390 (1935); Annot., 72 A.L.R. 687, 692 (1931); and especially Batchelder
v. City of Hood River, 63 Or. 472, 128 P. 439 (1912). The agreement also provided that
WPPSS, rather than the participants, would be the legal owner of the constructed facilities. Participants' Agreement §§ 1(v), 5. With regard to revenue bonds, some courts have
held that the municipality must own the system encumbered in order for the bonds to be
valid. See 15 E. MCQUILLIN, THz LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, § 43.34 (3d ed. 1970);
Rev. Rul. 54-41 and Rev. Proc. 82-26. A final difficulty with the contracts concerns the
unlimited and unspecified amount of potential liability of each participant. Participants'
Agreement §§ l(a), 1(b) and 5. Although the creation of an unlimited obligation would
appear to conflict with public policy, there are apparently no cases directly on point. See
generally, T & N Orr Co. v. County of Galveston, 169 S.W.2d 713, 714-15 (Tex. Civ. App.
1943); Levinson v. County of Bucks, 435 Pa. 62, 66, 254 A.2d 633, 636 (1969).
94. See Board of Comm'rs v. All Taxpayers, 360 So. 2d 863 (La. 1978). See also
citations, supra note 46.
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the local governments were liable for payment.
Unfortunately for the ratepayers of the various participants,
the WPPSS 4 and 5 power plants were not completed and will
never produce electricity. Because of tremendous cost escalations, licensing delays, alleged mismanagement, and a stable or
falling demand for electricity, the construction of the project
was terminated in 1982.96 Although work on both plants was
only 16 and 24 percent complete," the total expenses incurred
by WPPSS on the two plants exceeded 2.25 billion dollars.9
Thus, the total liability of the 88 participants for the principal,
interest and carrying charges on the WPPSS bonds will be in
excess of seven billion dollars. 98 Under the terms of the contract,
the participants must pay this enormous sum regardless of
whether they ever receive a single watt of electricity."9
Not surprisingly, there has been a great deal of litigation
over the validity of the Participants' Agreement. 10 However,
assuming for present purposes that the contracts will be upheld,
the broad special fund financing in this case will produce substantial adverse effects on the citizens of participating municipalities. Foremost among these will be significant rate increases.
For example, the city of Canby, Oregon will have an estimated
immediate increase in rates of 100 percent.10 1 Moreover, the
increase of electricity costs will likely discourage new businesses
from settling in the area or may force present companies to relocate. This in turn could potentially further increase the rate.
In any event, regardless of whether the WPPSS obligation is
referred to as a special fund obligation, a tax, or a tax
equivalent, the ratepayers of the Pacific Northwest will be
responsible for retiring seven billion dollars worth of debt and
interest. The situation serves to illustrate a point that cannot be
over emphasized-a project meeting all the requirements of a
95. See supra note 91, Plaintiff's Brief at 6.
96. Chemical Bank v. WPPSS, 99 Wash. 2d 772, 776 (1983).
97. Id.

98. Id.
99. Participants' Agreement §§ 1(v), 5.
100. DeFazio v. WPPSS, Lane County Cir. Ct. Case No. 16-81-11344 (Or. 1981);
Asson v. City of Burley, Supreme Ct. Case No. 14719 (Idaho 1982); Chemical Bank v.
WPPSS, 99 Wash. 2d 772 (1983); City of Springfield v. WPPSS, U. S. Dist. Ct. Case No.
82-1387 (D. Or. 1982); City of Springfield v. WPPSS, Lane County Cir. Ct. Case No. 1682-04068 (Or. 1982); Chemical Bank v. City of Bandon, U. S. Dist. Ct. Case No. 83-126
(D. Or. 1983).
101. See supra note 91, Plaintiff's Brief at 9.
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special fund doctrine effectively circumvents all the protections
and limitations of constitutional, statutory, and charter debt
provisions. As one commentator put it: "Where are you when
you are around the debt limitation? 'Another day older, and
deeper in debt.' 102
For the WPPSS contracts to comply with the Narrow Special Fund Doctrine, the sources of repayment on the agreement
would have to be limited to the revenues generated by the
nuclear power plants themselves (WPPSS 4 and 5) and not
10 3 Thus,
extend to the entire electrical revenues of the system.
under a narrow theory, the risks that a project will never be
completed or never produce revenue are upon the bondholder.
Admittedly, this fact will decrease the certainty of repayment of
the bonds and involve a higher interest rate than bonds for the
same project issued under a broad fund doctrine. However, this
extra cost would seem to be relatively inexpensive insurance
against a future WPPSS disaster and would appear to be an
expense mandated by many state constitutions.
When the broad view is pushed to its logical extreme, as
where a financing scheme calls for unlimited liability, a rate covenant and payment of the debt regardless of whether the project
ever produces revenue, the conceptual weaknesses of the Broad
Special Fund Doctrine emerge. Particularly troublesome is the
notion that the broad view places the risk of loss of municipal
construction projects upon the ratepayer/taxpayer, rather than
the bondholder. Such a course is arguably inconsistent with the
original intent of constitutional authors of insulating citizens
from the burdens of speculative, ill-advised expenditures.
If the WPPSS agreements do indeed lie within the bounds
102. Virtue, supra note 68, at 295.
103. Justice Dore of the Washington Supreme Court adopted a narrow fund analysis
in his concurrence in Chemical Bank v. WPPSS, 99 Wash. 2d at 804-05, in reaching the
conclusion that the Washington municipal and public utility district participants are not
responsible for payment on the WPPSS 4 and 5 revenue bonds. Justice Dore noted that
the Participants' Agreement must be read in light of the statutory framework governing
WPPSS, including the debt limitation found in art. VIII § 6 of the Washington State
Constitution. Id. at 801 and 805. Justice Dore emphasized that the Special Fund Doctrine must be analyzed in terms of the purpose of the constitutional provisions. Finally,
he noted "risk to the taxpaying public" as a consideration and stated his test for a valid
special fund as follows: "[d]oes the device employed create the evil the constitutional

limitation was designed to avoid? If such is the case, there is 'debt' for constitutional

analysis purposes." Id. at 804 and 806. The majority, however, found the participants
free from liability on other grounds. Id. at 797-99. See infra note 106.
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of current law,'0 one may wonder nonetheless whether it is wise
to uphold a body of case law which permits financial debacles of
this scale to occur. One alternative available is the adoption of a
Narrow Special Fund Doctrine, which would provide most of the
inherent advantages of the broad view while at the same time
fully shielding taxpayers from all risk of loss. Admittedly,
acceptance of a narrow doctrine would entail a significant shift
in municipal bond law and would potentially invalidate many
municipal projects. However, the initial impact of a changeover
could be substantially lessened simply by applying the new theory to a test case, such as any of the WPPSS suits, and then
applying it prospectively to all projects which are finalized subsequent to the decision. In this manner, the funding for existing
projects would not be affected.'0 "
In any event, the WPPSS lawsuits provide an excellent
opportunity for courts in the Pacific Northwest to reevaluate
this judicial creation known as the Broad Special Fund Doctrine.106 Regardless of the ultimate decision reached, if the question is approached through a conscious analysis of the tradeoff
between interest rates and public protection, and with due
104. The author doubts whether the WPPSS contracts are valid under existing
Broad Special Fund case law.
105. The prospective application doctrine has been utilized largely in the criminal
law field. However, the United States Supreme Court, in Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395
U.S. 701 (1969), applied the theory to a municipal matter. There the court struck down a
Louisiana law providing that only property taxpayers could vote in revenue bond elections. The Court noted that:
significant hardships would be imposed on cities, bond holders, and others connected with municipal utilities if our decision today were given full retroactive
effect. Where a decision of this Court could produce substantial inequitable
results if applied retroactively, there is ample basis in our cases for avoiding
the "injustice or hardship" by a holding of nonretroactivity.
395 U.S. at 706. See also Harvey Aluminum v. School Dist. No. 9, 248 Or. 167, 433 P.2d
247 (1967); County of Linn v. Rozelle, 150 Or. 245, 162 P.2d 177 (1945); Haines v. Anaconda Aluminum, 87 Wash. 2d 28, 549 P.2d 13 (1976); Annot., 10 A.L.R. 3d 1371 (1966).
106. Unfortunately, unlike Justice Dore, the majority in Chemical Bank v. WPPSS,
99 Wash. 2d at 797 entirely avoided entering into the broad special fund-narrow special
fund debate. Instead, Justice Brachtenbach, in his majority opinion, held that the Washington municipal and PUD participants lacked authority to enter into the agreement.
The key to the court's analysis rests in its holding that the participants: (1) did not
purchase electrical power; (2) effectively unconditionally guaranteed the WPPSS bonds;
(3) did not retain sufficient control over or ownership interest in the power plants; (4)
failed to follow the statutory requirements of WASH. Rav. CODE ch. 43.52 to properly
create a joint operating agency; and, (5) failed to follow the statutory requirements of the
Washington Nuclear, Thermal, Electric Generating Power Facilities-Joint Development
Act, WASH. REV. CODE ch. 54.44. Therefore, the act of entering into the Participants'
Agreement was ultra vires which rendered the contractual obligations void.
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regard for the original purposes of debt limitation, municipal
officials, bond markets, and ratepayers may be spared the prospect of similar occurrences in the future.

